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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 07/07/2011

Accident number: 711

Accident time: 08:40

Accident Date: 27/05/2009

Where it occurred: AF/2402/21188,
MF0322, Navy Deh
Village, Daman
District, Kandahar
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: 15/06/2009

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 07/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate training (?)
protective equipment not worn (?)
inadequate survey (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
File last changed: 14th September 2009
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-16 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by the AMAC South to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the Section Leader of [Demining group] DT-16. The accident occurred at
08:40 hours on 27 May 2009 at the minefield number AF/2402/21188/MF 0322, located in
Navy Deh village, Daman district of Kandahar province.
SUMMARY:
MF # AF2402/21188/MF322 is an anti-personal mine contaminated task around Kandahar
Airbase. During Russian invasion on Afghanistan a security belt of landmine was established
by the government forces to secure the airbase from the attacks of Mujahedeen. MF 322 is
one of the minefields covered in the above mentioned mine belt.
On 27 May 2009 at 0840 hrs [the Victim] the section leader of [Demining group] DT-16
entered to a mined area which was not covered in current MF, stepped on a mine and caused
the accident. According to the investigation report the section leader left the site for admin
area in order to bring painted rocks for the marking purpose, on the way back from the admin
area he wanted to use the shortest way, entered to unsafe area and the accident occurred.
He had taken off his PPE and visor. As a result of accident the victim has lost his left leg from
below knee and got multiple injuries on his right leg and both hands.
CONCLUSIONS:
Poor management of the team daily operations caused this accident. As the team leader did
not have a complete sight of his team to control his personnel during the operations.
Additionally deminers should paint the rocks in the site; there is no need to carry painted
rocks from a distance of around 500 meters for the marking of clearance lanes. It is not the
job of section leaders to carry painted rocks to the team, but they are assigned to conduct
supervision throughout the operations period.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[Demining group] operation is recommended to review the current capability of command
group in the team and take necessary actions. [Demining group] management is also
requested to come up with a management solution to this problem and present their plan of
action to prevent such accident in the future. MACCA OPS department expects to hear from
[Demining group] by no later than 22nd of June 2009 that:
•

identifies why the accident occurred

•

Puts into place steps designed to prevent the recurrence of this type of accident in
the future.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 896

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: None

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: severe Hands; severe Leg
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "the victim has lost his left leg from below
knee and got multiple injuries on his right leg and both hands".

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the
investigators state that the Victim was engaged in an activity that he should not have been
doing – because he should have been supervising deminers. The cause may have been an
Inadequate survey because it is likely that the Victim thought he was walking across a non
hazardous area when the accident occurred. The area may have been a recorded hazardous
area, in which case the field supervisors should have been told that there directly adjacent
task areas. The failure to tell the demining group that there was a hazardous area alongside,
(or for the group managers to tell its field supervisors that there was), is a serious
Management Control Inadequacy, so this is the secondary cause assigned.
The summary asks the demining group to identify a cause for the accident, and to identify the
corrective measures needed. This implies that the investigators were relying on an “internal”
investigation rather than making an independent investigation themselves. It is possible that
the security situation at the time prevented the investigators from visiting the accident site.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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